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ABSTRACT
The literature exploring other regarding behavior sheds important light on interesting social
phenomena, yet less attention has been given to how the received results speak to
foundational assumptions within economics. Our study synthesizes the empirical evidence,
showing that recent work challenges convex preference theory but is largely consistent
with rational choice theory. Guided by this understanding, we design a new, more
demanding test of a central tenet of rational choice—the Contraction Axiom—within a
sharing framework. Making use of more than 300 dictators participating in a series of
allocation games, we show that sharing choices violate the Contraction Axiom. We
advance a new theory of moral reference points that augments standard models to explain
our experimental data. Beyond capturing the data patterns in our experiment, our theory
also organizes the broader sharing patterns in the received literature and has applications
to strategic games with contractions.
JEL Classifications: C93, D03, D64
Keywords: experiment, giving, taking, altruism, moral cost
* We thank the John Templeton Foundation under the Science of Philanthropy Initiative and the National
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1. INTRODUCTION
One of the most influential bodies of economics research in the past two decades revolves around
whether and to what extent people value efficiency, fairness, equity, and reciprocity. Experimental
work has provided evidence that such motivations can be important in creating and determining
surplus allocations in markets (see, e.g., Fehr et al., 1993; Bandiera et al., 2005; Landry et al.,
2010; Cabrales et al., 2010; Hertz and Taubinsky, 2017), with accompanying theoretical models
of social preferences providing a framework to rationalize such behaviors (see, e.g., Rabin, 1993;
Charness and Rabin, 2002; Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger, 2004; Fehr and Schmidt, 1999; Bolton
and Ockenfels, 2000; Andreoni and Miller, 2002; Cox, Friedman and Sadiraj, 2008; Fudenberg
and Levine, 2012; Bourles et al., 2017; Celen et al., 2017; Galperti and Strulovici, 2017).
Within this line of research, a class of experiments is used to measure pro-social
preferences, with typical experiments taking the form of dictator games, gift exchange games,
public goods games, ultimatum games, and trust games. While such games have shown that social
preferences touch many areas of economic interactions, what is largely missing is a deeper
understanding of whether individual choices violate deeply held economic tenets. At this point, it
is too early to conclude definitively, but the received literature suggests that observed sharing
behaviors are consonant with neoclassical theory. For instance, in a seminal study, Andreoni and
Miller (2002) show that in a modified dictator game subjects’ choices satisfy the key axiom of
revealed preference theory. 1 More recently, Andersen et al. (2011) provide data that reveals
demand curves for fairness in an ultimatum game are downward sloping. While in its infancy, this
work suggests that certain sharing behaviors can be captured by the standard economic model.
The shortage of work testing basic tenets in the sharing literature contrasts sharply with
other areas of behavioral economics, which have lent deep insights into foundational assumptions
within economics. For example, for riskless choice, received results reveal that many consumers
have preferences defined over changes in consumption, but individual behavior converges to the
neoclassical prediction as trading experience intensifies (see, e.g., Kahneman et al., 1990; List,
2004; Engelmann and Hollard, 2010).
Relatedly, for choice that involves risk, several scholars (see, e.g., Harless, 1992; Hey,
1995; and Hey and Orme, 1994) present econometric estimates of indifference curves under risk
at the individual level that show neither expected utility theory nor the non-expected utility
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Fisman et al. (2007) extend this earlier work by developing an experimental framework that allows the researcher
to not only test the consistency of choices but also recover individual level preferences for giving. Fisman et al.
(2015) explore how preferences for giving are impacted by macroeconomic shocks.
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alternatives do a satisfactory job of organizing behavior. Choi et al. (2007) extend this analysis by
developing an experimental protocol that allows the researcher to both test the consistency of
choices with the assumption of utility maximization and estimate a two-parameter utility function
for each individual. These examples are not exhaustive, as there are many other active research
inquiries in this spirit, including those exploring intertemporal choice (see, e.g., Laibson, 1997;
O’Donoghue and Rabin, 1999, 2001; Frederick et al., 2002), asymmetry and transitivity of
preferences (Tversky, 1969; Slovic 1995; Cox and Grether, 1996; List, 2002), and conditional
altruism (Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger, 2004; Cox, Friedman, and Sadiraj, 2008).
Our study follows the spirit of this broader literature by exploring whether basic economic
tenets are satisfied in sharing choices as observed in the dictator game, which has emerged as a
workhorse in the social science literature. Recently, to understand more deeply the factors that
motivate sharing, a number of scholars have augmented the standard dictator game by varying the
feasible action set (e.g., List, 2007; Bardsley, 2008; Cappelen, et al., 2013). These studies report
that dictators change their allocations in interesting ways when presented a chance to take as well
as to give to others. For example, in the typical dictator game the experiment is framed such that
“giving nothing” is the least generous act, and substantial sums of money are given away (Engel,
2011). Yet, research shows that if subjects are allowed to give or take money from the other player,
they give much less to the other player on average.
The first goal of our study is to step back from the burgeoning literature and attempt to
synthesize what we have learned theoretically from the experimental exercises of List (2007) and
others. We explain that the traditional dictator game, wherein more than 60 percent of dictators
pass a positive amount of money, is consistent with neoclassical convex preference theory (Hicks,
1946; Samuelson, 1947). Yet, more recent results from this literature (e.g., List, 2007; Bardsley,
2008; Cappelen, et al., 2013) provide evidence that challenges convex preference theory.
Nevertheless, these new data are largely consistent with rational choice theory (Sen, 1971).
Our second goal is to build on the experimental literature by conducting a dictator game
experiment that generates a stark test of a foundational assumption within economics: the
Contraction Axiom.2 For singleton choice sets, the Contraction Axiom (Chernoff, 1954) is the
necessary and sufficient condition for a choice function to be rationalizable by a complete and
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For singleton choice sets, the Contraction Axiom states that if x is chosen from feasible set F then it will also be
chosen from any contraction of set F that contains x.

4
transitive ordering (Sen, 1971). 3 To test whether this central theoretical condition holds, we
present an experiment with dictator games in which we systematically vary both the feasible set
and the actions available to the dictator.4 Designing an experiment that preserves the feasible set
but allows dictator giving or taking provides one type of test of the Contraction Axiom. This
important design departure from the List (2007) and Bardsley (2008) work makes it possible for
us to explore rational choice theory at a deeper level. Furthermore, by preserving the initial
endowment but contracting the feasible set, we depart from recent literature on effects of social
norms on play in dictator games (Krupka and Weber, 2013; Kimbrough and Vostroknutov, 2015).
Unlike this related work, our design allows discrimination between the effects on choices of initial
endowments from the effects of contracting feasible sets while preserving endowments, which
turns out to be crucial to discriminating between rational choice theory (the Contraction Axiom)
and its special case, convex preference theory.
The experimental data yields several insights. First, we find that our subjects – students at
Georgia State University - exhibit patterns of giving and taking behavior similar to other university
students (List, 2007; Bardsley, 2008; Korenok, Millner, and Razzolini, 2014) and to a
representative sample of Danish adults (Cappelen, et al., 2013). In particular, contracting the
feasible set to remove taking options causes subjects to provide higher payoffs to recipients and
keep less for themselves. Second, and most importantly, in our experiment such contraction causes
subjects to keep more for themselves even when the contracted set contains the originally-chosen
allocation, which is inconsistent with the Contraction Axiom and therefore at odds with extant
rational choice theory. Crucially, combined with previous results, our data suggest how rational
choice theory can be modified to explain the overall behavioral patterns.
This deeper understanding leads to the third goal of our study: to develop an axiomatic
foundation for other-regarding behavior and test empirical validity of the new axiomatic theory
with data from our own experiment and from previous work.5 Our theoretical development follows
the approach in Cox and Sadiraj (2010) to extend choice theory to accommodate dictator game
data that violates a central tenet of conventional theory – in this case, the Contraction Axiom. The
key component of our theory is the identification of moral reference points that are observable

For set-valued choice functions, rationality is equivalent to Sen’s (1971) Properties α and β (see below). Property α
is the Contraction Axiom.
4
In this paper, we have elected to use “action set” to refer to actions of taking or giving whereas “feasible set”
denotes the conventional set of feasible allocations, i.e., it is ordered pairs of dictator’s and recipient’s payoffs.
5
See also experiments by Grossman and Eckel, 2015, Engel, 2011; Korenok et al., 2013; Korenok et al., 2014;
Zhang and Ortmann, 2014.
3
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features of the environment, i.e., feasible sets and initial endowments.6 We view our study as
fitting in nicely with the “theory speaking to experiment and experiment speaking to theory”
research culture that has permeated experimental economics for decades.
The remainder of our paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the design of our
experiment and the procedures. Section 3 discusses the implications of extant theory and develops
our axiomatic theory incorporating moral reference points. Section 4 presents our experimental
results. Section 5 presents implications of our theory for related experiments in Andreoni and
Miller (2002), Korenok, et al. (2014), Krupka and Weber (2013), and Lazear, Malmendier, and
Weber (2012). Section 6 explains how our theory can be applied to strategic games with
contractions and presents applications to moonlighting and investment games and to carrot/stick,
carrot, and stick games. Section 7 concludes.

2. BACKGROUND, DESIGN, AND PROTOCOL
Kahneman et al. (1986) was the first to conduct a dictator game experiment in economics, giving
subjects a hypothetical choice of choosing an even split of $20 ($10 each) with an anonymous
subject or an uneven split ($18, $2), favoring themselves. Three-quarters of the subjects opted for
the equal split. The wheels were set in motion for three decades of research examining sharing and
allocation of surplus in the lab and field. One stylized result that has emerged from the large
literature is that more than 60 percent of subjects pass a positive amount to their anonymous
partners, and conditional on a positive transfer, roughly 20 percent of the endowment is passed.
Even though some scholars have argued that such giving patterns violate deeply held
economic doctrines, it is important to recall that preference order axioms do not uniquely identify
the commodity bundles. In a two-commodity case, my preferences may be defined over my
hotdogs and my hamburgers. But the same formal theory of preferences can be applied to two
commodities identified as my hamburgers and your hamburgers. Identification of the commodities
in a bundle is an interpretation of the theory. In this way, neoclassical preference theory (Hicks,
1946; Samuelson, 1947) can be used for agents who are either self-regarding or other-regarding.
As such, strictly speaking, the received results of generous sharing in standard dictator games do
not represent a rejection of neoclassical preference theory. Rather, they represent a rejection of a
joint hypothesis: neoclassical preferences and the assumption that preferences are self-regarding.
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Moral cost models have been suggested in previous work (e.g., Levitt and List, 2007; DellaVigna et al., 2012;
Kessler and Leider, 2012; Ferraro and Price, 2013; Krupka and Weber, 2013; Kimbrough and Vostroknutov, 2015.
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More recently, List (2007) and Bardsley (2008), amongst others, have used laboratory
dictator game experiments to explore how choices are influenced by introducing opportunities for
the dictator to take from another subject. This line of work presents a challenge for convex
preference theory, as we explain. We use this literature as our starting point, and design treatments
that pose a more fundamental challenge to choice rationality than heretofore explored.

2.1 Experimental Design
Following List (2007), our design begins by introducing an action set in which the dictator can
either give to or take from the recipient’s initial endowment and compares outcomes in this
augmented game to those observed in dictator games in which the participant can only give to, or
take from, the recipient. We extend this line of inquiry by considering treatments that vary the
initial endowments but preserve the permissible set of actions.7 If the motivation behind choices
is driven by final allocations only, as assumed in conventional theory, variation in the initial
endowments within a given feasible set should have no impact on observed dictator behavior.
Figure 1 shows three budget lines labeled “Equal,” “Inequality,” and “Envy.” The finite
feasible sets are ordered pairs of integers on the lines. Labelling of the feasible sets reflects the
location of the midpoints B j , j  Q, I , E on the lines. The Symmetric treatments have endowment
at B j and permit the dictator to give (move the allocation towards A j ) or take (move the allocation
towards C j ). The Take treatments have endowment at B j and permit the dictator to take (move
the allocation towards C j ). The Give treatments have endowment at C j and permit the dictator
to give (move the allocation towards B j ). There are two prominent features of this design: (a) the
corresponding Take and Give treatments have the same feasible set [ B j , C j ] ; and (b) a Symmetric
treatment’s feasible set [ Aj , C j ] contains the corresponding Take and Give feasible set [ B j , C j ]
as a proper subset.
The experimental design is 3  3: (Equal, Inequality, Envy)  (Symmetric, Take, Give).8
In the Inequality-Give treatment (with endowment at point CI in the middle panel): the recipient
has an endowment of 3; the dictator has an endowment of 27 and can give up to 8 to the recipient.
7

These treatments build upon work by Korenok et al. (2014) and Grossman and Eckel (2015), who employ a variant
of the dictator game to explore the effect of give or take actions on choices.
8
The treatments used in the experiment reported herein are similar to ones used in the experiment reported in the
working paper, Cox et al. (2016), which utilizes variations in initial endowments and feasible actions to explore the
importance of moral reference points on the choices of young children.
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In the Inequality-Take treatment (with endowment at point BI in the middle panel): the recipient
has an endowment of 11; the dictator has an endowment of 19 and can take up to 8 from the
recipient. In the Inequality-Symmetric treatment (with endowment at point BI in the middle
panel): the recipient has an endowment of 11; the dictator has an endowment of 19 and can give
up to 8 or take up to 8. The Equal and Envy treatments change the locations of the (point B or
point C ) endowments but preserve the give, take, or symmetric action sets. In the Equal feasible
set, the Symmetric and Take endowment (at point BQ in the left panel) is 15 for the recipient and
15 for the dictator. In the Envy feasible set, the Symmetric and Take endowment (at point BE in
the right panel) is 19 for the recipient and 11 for the dictator.
FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE: FEASIBLE SETS
In the Inequality-Symmetric and Envy-Give treatments, the dictator is faced with an
allocation decision over a budget set that crosses the 45 degree line, as in most standard dictator
games. In the Equal-Take and Equal-Symmetric treatments, the initial endowment lies on the 45
degree line. However, the treatments differ in that the feasible set for the Equal-Take treatment
lies on and below the 45 degree line whereas the feasible budget set for the Equal-Symmetric
treatment crosses the 45 degree line.
The nine treatments are constructed to stress-test all consequentialist theories: (a) the same
action (of give or take) amount x produces very different allocations (consequences) in different
treatment cells; (b) the same allocation (consequence) results from different give or take actions
in different treatment cells.
2.2 Protocol
The experiment was conducted in the laboratory of the Experimental Economics Center at Georgia
State University using students recruited from the student body at Georgia State. When they agreed
to participate, subjects knew only that they would be in an economics experiment, but not the exact
nature of the experiment. Subjects were given as much time as they wanted to read instructions on
their computer monitors. After they were finished reading, summary instructions were projected
on a screen and read aloud by an experimenter to make clear that all subjects were given the same
information about the decision task. All subjects participated in two practice dictator decisions
without payoffs to become familiar with both the underlying allocation task and the computer
interface. No information was given to subjects about others’ practice decisions. After the practice
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decisions were completed, subjects were informed that the computer would randomly assign them
to be active decision makers or passive recipients and that this information would appear on their
screen before the start of the first actual round of play. They were further informed that each active
subject would make two decisions while paired with the same recipient and that one of the two
decisions would be randomly selected for payoff once both decision rounds were completed. It
was stressed that these pairings were anonymous and that participants would not know the identity
of the person with whom they were paired.
The two decision tasks each subject faced allow us to conduct within-subjects tests of
consistency with rational choice theory. A subject made decisions in Give and Take action sets for
the same (Equal or Inequality or Envy) setting; or the subject made decisions in Symmetric and
Give or Take action sets for the same setting. The order of the games each active subject faced
was independently randomly selected so there would be no treatment order effects. Subjects were
asked to complete a short survey after all decisions were made. Once all subjects had completed
the survey, they were paid individually and in private their earnings for the chosen decision round.
Subject instructions and the survey are available online: http://excen.gsu.edu/jccox/instructions.

3. THEORY DEVELOPMENT
As noted above, Figure 1 portrays the feasible sets faced by subjects in our dictator games. Selfregarding (or homo economicus) preferences imply the choice of C j in all treatments. Models of
other-regarding preferences predict choices that may differ from C j . For strictly convex
preferences, one can make additional statements as follows. When (in a Symmetric action set) a
most preferred allocation Q*j in feasible set [ Aj , C j ] does not belong to the subset [ B j , C j ] then
strict convexity requires B j to be the unique most preferred allocation when (in a Give or Take
action set) the budget set is [ B j , C j ] .9 In addition, when (in a Give or Take action set) a most
preferred allocation Q*j in feasible set [ B j , C j ] is not B j then strict convexity requires Q*j to be
the unique most preferred allocation when the budget set is [ Aj , C j ] . These statements apply to
neoclassical theory of other-regarding preferences and to popular models of social preferences

9

For any given feasible allocation, X from [ B j , C j ] , allocation B j is a convex combination of X and Q*j (that

belongs to ( B j , C j ] . Since Q*j is revealed preferred to X in [ Aj , C j ] , by strict convexity B j is strictly preferred to
X.
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(e.g., Fehr and Schmidt, 1999; Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000; Charness and Rabin, 2002).10
Choice implied by convex preferences and rational choice are different concepts. Convex
preference theory is a special case of rational choice theory that imposes far stronger restrictions
on observable choices. Consequentialist rational choice theory requires that there be a choice
function (Zermelo, 1904) which satisfies certain consistency axioms (Samuelson, 1938; Chernoff,
1954; Arrow, 1959; Sen, 1971, 1986). A choice function, defined on a collection X of nonempty
sets, assigns to each set S in X a choice set S  of elements of S. A choice function is singlevalued if the choice sets are singletons. If we let F  denote the choice set when the opportunity
set is F and G  be the choice set when the opportunity set is G then the Chernoff (1954)
Contraction Axiom (also known as Property α from Sen 1971) states:
Property  : if G  F then F   G  G
In other words, a most-preferred allocation f   F  from feasible set F remains a most-preferred
allocation in any contraction of the set that contains the allocation f * . For non-singleton choice
sets, there is a second consistency axiom, Sen’s (1971) Property β.11 In this paper we consider
singleton choice sets, in which Property  simplifies to: if f *  G then f *  g * , i.e., f * is also
the choice in G .
For finite feasible sets, Property  (the Contraction Axiom) is the necessary and sufficient
condition for singleton choice sets to be rationalizable by a weak order (Sen, 1971).12 So we focus
on properties of singleton choice sets and implications of Property  , which in our dictator game
experiment are as follows:
Choice Function Hypothesis. Given feasible set [ B j , C j ] , allocation Pj* is chosen when
the action set is Take and the endowment is at B j if and only if it is chosen when the action
set is Give and the endowment is at C j .
Contraction Hypothesis. If allocation Q *j , chosen in the Symmetric action set with
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Note that these statements would not apply to some models of warm glow preferences, such as Korenok et al.
(2013).
11
Property β: if G  F and G  F    then G  F  . In other words, if the most-preferred set F* for feasible set F
contains at least one most-preferred point from the contraction set then it contains all of the most-preferred points of
the contraction set. For finite sets, Properties α and β are necessary and sufficient conditions for a choice function to
be rationalizable by a weak order (Sen, 1971). In case of choice sets being singletons, Property β is automatically
satisfied.
12
A weak order is complete and transitive.
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feasible set [ Aj , C j ] , belongs to the subset [ B j , C j ] then Q *j is also chosen when the action
set is Give or Take and the feasible set is [ B j , C j ] .

The Choice Function Hypothesis is an immediate implication of choice sets being
singletons: the choice set of feasible set [ B j , C j ] contains one element, Pj* . This hypothesis is also
implied by the Property  because any set (e.g. [ B j , C j ] ) is a subset of itself.
A behavioral interpretation of the Contraction Hypothesis as follows. Choice of Q *j
belonging to [ B j , C j ] when the feasible set is [ Aj , C j ] reveals that allocations in [ Aj , B j ) are less
desirable alternatives than Q *j ; therefore excluding them from the feasible set should not affect
choice. For the sets in Figure 1, if a subject chooses an allocation in [ B j , C j ] in the Symmetric
game then she should choose the same allocation in the corresponding Take and Give games.
Unlike convexity, Property  has no implication for choice from feasible set [ B j , C j ] if the
choice from [ Aj , C j ] is contained in [ Aj , B j ) – a distinction that has been overlooked in the prior
literature.
Data from many dictator game experiments with giving and taking refute strict convexity,
but choice rationality remains unclear. For example, consider Figure 2, which shows data from
List (2007) and Bardsley (2008).13 Previous discussions of List’s data have focused on comparing
the 29% of choices of 0 in the Baseline (standard dictator game allowing giving up to $5) treatment
with the 65% of the choices of -1 or 0 in the Take 1 treatment (standard dictator game augmented
to allow taking $1 from the recipient). An implication of convexity is that these figures should be
(statistically) the same – a pattern that is clearly refuted by the data.14
FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE: HISTOGRAMS FOR LIST AND BARDSLEY DATA

Convexity, however, is not a necessary condition for choice rationality, so comparison of
these 29% and 65% figures does not allow the researcher to draw conclusions about choice
rationality. An illustration of rational choices for non-convex preferences is shown in Figure 3. A
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The data for List (2007) are from the JPE online appendix.
The initial endowments are the same in these two treatments hence we can discuss implications of convex
preference theory for either payoffs or transfers.
14
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dictator with such preferences would choose y from the set [ A, C ] but switch to x (rather than
B ) when she faces set [ B, C ] .

FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE: EXAMPLE OF CHOICE WITH NON-CONVEX PREFERENCES

The feasible set for the Baseline treatment in List (2007) is a contraction of the set for the
Take 1 treatment. Therefore, by Property  , anyone choosing an amount from $0 to $5 in the
Take 1 treatment should make the same choice in the Baseline treatment. In contrast to the special
case of convex preferences, rational choice theory offers no suggestions for the Baseline treatment
if one is observed to choose -$1 in the Take 1 treatment. Rational choice theory: (a) can
accommodate someone who takes in the Take 1 treatment and gives in the Baseline treatment; but
(b) cannot accommodate someone who gives different amounts in the Take 1 and Baseline
treatments.
The above properties of rational choice theory imply that each of the bars portraying
fractions of choices of $0 to $5 in the Take 1 treatment should not be higher than the corresponding
bar for choices in the Baseline. With the exception of the bar at $1.50 (corresponding to two
observations in the Take 1 treatment), the List (2007) data are consistent with rational choice
theory. Similarly, data shown in Figure 2 from Experiment 2 conducted by Bardsley (2008) are
inconsistent with convex preferences but are mostly consistent with rational choice theory; the bar
at $1.50 (2 observations) is the only inconsistency with rational choice theory in Experiment 2
data.
As we shall explain in Section 4, data from some of the treatments in our experiment are
inconsistent with rational choice theory, which prompts interest in modification of the theory. We
next turn our attention to that topic to provide the theoretical foundation for our experimental
design and to aid in the interpretation of the data patterns discussed in the empirical results section
that will follow.

3.2 Theory of Moral Reference Points
A framework that has been used to describe giving, taking, and related behaviors builds upon the
notion of moral cost (Levitt and List, 2007; List, 2007; Lazear et al., 2012; DellaVigna et al., 2012)
or concern for norm compliance (Kessler and Leider, 2012; Krupka and Weber, 2013; Kimbrough
and Vostroknutov, 2015). Using this framework, individuals are said to share with others to avoid
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experiencing moral cost from failing to do so or from taking actions that are deemed socially
inappropriate. We put this approach on an axiomatic foundation that incorporates moral reference
points that are observable features of feasible sets.
We begin with an intuitive discussion of moral reference points, and moral monotonicity
in choice behavior, for the specific context of dictator games. We then provide a formal definition
of a moral reference point to make clear that it is an observable feature of feasible sets. We
subsequently formalize the definition of moral monotonicity in the form of an axiom that modifies
(consequentialist) rational choice theory.
To get a feeling of the concept of moral cost, consider the feasible sets in the right (Envy)
and the left (Inequality) budget sets in Figure 1. The lowest feasible payoff for the recipient is $11
in the Envy-Give treatment and $3 in the Inequality-Give treatment. Allocating the recipient a
payoff of $11 may inflict moral cost in the Envy-Give treatment (where it results from the most
selfish 15 possible action of giving $0) whereas that same allocation of $11 may deliver moral
benefit in the Inequality-Give treatment (where it results from the most generous possible action
of giving $8). It seems plausible to assume that moral cost decreases with the difference between
payoff allocated to the recipient and the recipient payoff that would result from the most selfish
feasible option of the dictator. We build this intuition into our model by assuming that one
dimension of the moral reference point for sharing behavior is determined by the recipient payoff
at the most selfish feasible action available to the dictator. This is dimension r2 in our formal
definition of moral reference points below.
Another intuitive feature of moral cost relates to the dictator’s position. Consider, for
example, the Inequality-Take and Envy-Take treatments. Allocating oneself a payoff of $19 in the
Inequality-Take treatment results from the most generous feasible action of taking $0 from the
recipient. In contrast, allocating oneself a $19 payoff in the Envy-Take treatment results from the
most selfish possible action of taking the maximum of $8 from the recipient. It seems plausible to
assume that moral cost increases with the difference between the amount of payoff allocated to
oneself and the own-payoff that would result from the most generous action available. We build
this intuition into our model by assuming that the other dimension of the moral reference point for

15

In discussing dictator games in this section, we label choices in the way it is most commonly done in everyday
conversation. A “most selfish” choice is the one that provides the dictator with the largest money payoff (and the
recipient with the smallest money payoff) out of all feasible choices. A “most generous” choice is the one that
provides the recipient with the largest money payoff (and the dictator with the smallest money payoff) out of all
feasible choices.
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sharing behavior is determined, in part, by the own-payoff that results from the most generous
action available to the dictator. But the dictator’s moral cost may also vary inversely with the
entitlement provided by her endowment in the game. In the Inequality-Symmetric treatment, for
example, allocating oneself a payoff of $19 results from the action of standing pat, and neither
taking of giving anything. In contrast, in the Envy-Symmetric treatment allocating oneself a payoff
of $19 results from the action of taking the maximum feasible amount of $8 from the recipient.
We build these intuitions into the model by assuming that the other dimension of the moral
reference point is a convex combination of the own-payoff that results from the most generous
possible choice and the entitlement payoff provided by the dictator’s endowment. The central
results that follow are invariant to the mixing proportion used in the convex combination. For
simplicity, we use the mixing proportion one-half. This is dimension r1 in our formal definition of
moral reference point below.
We now formalize these intuitions with an axiomatic model that follows the approach used
in Cox and Sadiraj (2010). The idea is to require that choices from feasible sets that preserve moral
reference points (defined below) satisfy Property  and to present a concept of moral reference
points that are determined by observable features of feasible sets. Throughout our discussion in
this section we use dictator games as an example to illustrate concepts but the model has more
general applicability, as explained in section 6.
Let (m, y) denote an ordered pair of payoffs in which my payoff, m is that of the dictator
and your payoff, y is that of the recipient. Let the dictator’s opportunity set be a compact finite
set F . Let mo and y o be the maximum feasible payoffs for the dictator and the recipient, that is
mo ( F )  max{m | (m, y )  F} and y o ( F )  max{ y | (m, y )  F}

It is natural to think of the minimal expectations point, (m* , y* ) as the dictator’s payoff when the
recipient’s gets y o and recipient’s payoff when the dictator gets mo , i.e.,

m ( F )  min{m : (m, y o ( F )  F} and y ( F )  min{ y : (mo ( F ), y  F} .
Moral cost may depend on the minimal expectations point and payoff entitlement from the
decision maker’s endowment. Therefore we propose as a moral reference point an ordered pair
that agrees with the minimal expectations point on the second (recipient’s) payoff dimension and
is a convex combination of the minimal expectations point and the initial endowment em on the
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first (dictator’s) payoff dimension. For dictator game feasible sets we consider, the moral reference
points are given by:16

r F  (( 12 m ( F )  12 em ), y ( F ))
An algorithm for locating moral reference points is provided here for the Give, Take, and
Symmetric action sets and Equal, Inequality, and Envy endowment treatments shown in Figure 1.
With such downward-sloping budget lines, a moral reference point can be located by: (a) first, find
the minimal expectations point, (m* , y* ) by constructing a right triangle with the budget line as the
hypotenuse and the vertical and horizontal sides below and to the left of the budget line; (b) second,
find the midpoint of the line segment joining (m* , y* ) and e (the endowment), and (c) finally,
orthogonally project the midpoint onto the line segment joining (m* , y* ) and the most selfish point.
The moral reference points, r F  (r1F , r2F ) for our various treatments are shown in Table 1.
For the Inequality treatment, for example, the moral reference points are (23,3) in Give, (19,3) in
Take, and (15,3) in Symmetric.
TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE
We use action sets shown in Figure 1 to illustrate a behavioral interpretation of moral
reference points. If we look at the Inequality treatment the recipient coordinate, r2 (=3) of the moral
reference points are the same across the three scenarios: Give, Take and Symmetric. In contrast
the dictator coordinate, r1 varies from 23 to 19 to 15, which reflects the changes in the dictator
minimal expectation payoff or initial endowment. One would expect a dictator to feel more entitled
to a larger own payoff as her moral reference coordinate decreases while the recipient’s coordinate
remains constant. On the contrary, if we look at the Inequality-Symmetric, Equal-Take and EnvyGive treatments, the dictator coordinate, r1 (=15) of the moral reference point remains constant. In
contrast, the recipient coordinate r2 varies from 3 to 7 to 11, which reflects the changes in the
recipient’s minimal expectation payoff. One would expect a dictator to feel obliged to allocate
more to the recipient as the recipient’s moral reference coordinate increases while the dictator’s
coordinate remains constant, as formalized in MMA.

16

A less specific definition of the moral reference point is ( r , r )  (( m ( F )  (1   )e ), y ( F )) where  is between 0
1

2



m



and 1. Any value of   [0,1) provides moral reference points that make MMA consistent with all of the contraction
and action set effects we discuss for the experiment reported herein.
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Our many applications of theory in this paper will all be to two-agent (dictator and
strategic) games. Some future applications of our theory to novel situations, however, will require
identification of the observable moral reference points when there are more than two agents.
Endowments for n agents will typically be specified, hence are observable. Identification of
observable minimal expectations payoffs for n  2 players can proceed as follows. Let y denote
the vector of payoffs of n players. Let the feasible set be a finite set F . Let yi 0 (i  1, 2, , n) be
the maximum feasible payoff for player i (  1, 2, n ), that is
y oj ( F )  max{ y j | y  F}

The minimal expectations point, y*F is defined as follows. For each player j , define player i ’s
minimal expectation payoff with respect to j as
y*Fij  min{ yi | ( y j , y oj  F}
F
Let Si = {y*ij
: j ¹ i) be the set of i ’s minimal expectation points. Naturally, player i expects her

payoff to be no smaller than the smallest element in Si ; thus y*iF = min Si , which is the ith element of
F

the vector y* .

We now turn our attention to moral monotonicity. We postulate that agents’ choices,
characterized by moral cost concerns, satisfy a monotonicity criterion with respect to moral
reference points. We now formalize this in an axiom for n -players. Let F * be the choice set for
feasible set F (and similarly for G * and G ). Let r G and r F be the moral reference points for
feasible sets G and F , and let áñ be the notation for “not smaller” or “not larger.” For every
player i ( 1, , n) one has:
Moral Monotonicity Axiom (MMA):
G
F
G
F
*
*



*
If G  F , ri  ri and ri  ri , then f  F  G  gi  fi , g  G

In words, MMA says the following. Suppose that G is a subset of F that contains some
choice f * from F . Suppose also that the moral reference points of F and G differ from each
other only with respect to the value of dimension i . If the moral reference point in G is more
favorable to individual i, then no choice from G allocates him less than f * . Similarly, if the moral
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reference point in G is less favorable to player i , then no choice from G allocates him more than

f .
What are the implications of MMA for contractions that preserve moral reference points
and contain choices from the bigger set? We show that for such subsets MMA implies that the
choice set is a singleton and that conventional axioms of rationality (Sen’s 1971 Properties  and

 ) are satisfied. The modified form of Sen’s Property 𝛼 for sets that preserve the moral reference
point is17
Property  M : if G  F and r G  r F then F *  G  G*
For singleton choice sets, this simplifies to: if f *  G and r G  r F then g* = f * is chosen in G .
We are ready now to state implications of MMA for choices.18
Proposition 1: MMA implies Property  M
Proof. See Appendix A.
Thus, for opportunity sets that preserve moral reference points, MMA suffices for choices to be
rationalizable.
3.3 Testable Implications of MMA vs. Property 
MMA has many testable implications for the action sets and endowment treatments in our
experiment. For example, in the Equal treatment, the moral reference point is (19,7) in the Give
action set but (15,7) in the Take action set. Therefore, MMA implies that the choice in Give is
southeast of the choice in Take, which means the dictator allocates a (weakly) larger own payoff
in Give than in Take. This contrasts with the implication of conventional rational choice theory
that the Give and Take action sets have the same outcomes. The same type of argument can be
used to show that, in the Envy and Equal endowment treatments, MMA implies a smaller
allocation to the dictator in the Take than in the Give (but larger than in the Symmetric) whereas
conventional theory implies identical allocations when from [B,C].

17

For non-singleton choice sets, the analogue of Sen’s (1971) Property β is Property βM: if

then G  F   implies G  F .
18
The proof of Proposition 1 in Appendix A also shows that MMA implies Property βM .
*

*

*

*

G  F and r G  r F
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4. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
4.1 Overview
612 subjects (306 dictators) participated in the experiment. None of the dictators had previous
experience in dictator games. Each session lasted approximately 50 minutes and each dictator
made two decisions. The actual payoffs (from the randomly selected payoff rounds) for dictators
were: $19.46 (average) with the range $8 (minimum) to $27 (maximum). Average payoffs and
transfers19 for all data from nine treatment cells are reported in Table 1.
Less than 1/3 (166 out of 612) of observed choices correspond to the most selfish feasible
options and less than 1/5 (57 out of 306) of dictators appear selfish (i.e., always choose the most
selfish option). Data exhibit egocentric altruism (Cox and Sadiraj, 2007) as almost all choices
(98%) are such that the dictator’s final payoff (weakly) exceeded recipient’s final payoff.20 All
data from Give and Take treatments with feasible sets [Bk,Ck] are usable for testing convex
preference theory, conventional rational choice theory (Property  ), and modified rational choice
theory incorporating the Moral Monotonicity Axiom (MMA). Choices from [Ak,Bk) in a
Symmetric treatment are not usable for testing rational choice theory. Overall, 94% (575 out of
612) of choices are from sets [Bi,Ci] and are thus usable in testing all theories.
We begin with tests of convex preferences, Principal  and MMA using only withinsubjects choice pairs. Subsequently, we use all of the data to ascertain whether observed subjects’
transfers are affected by moral reference points as predicted by MMA.
4.2 Consistency of Dictators’ Choices with Theoretical Models.
Each dictator made two decisions from the same (Inequality, Equal or Envy) environment: 96
dictators faced budget set [Bk,Ck] twice, in one Give action set and one Take action set; a different
group of 98 dictators faced budget set [Ak,Ck] in the Symmetric action set and budget set [Bk,Ck]
in the Give action set; and another group of 112 dictators faced budget set [Ak,Ck] in the Symmetric
action set and budget set [Bk,Ck] in the Take action set. We created a dummy variable, Consistency,
that takes value 1 only if a individual’s two decisions agreed with a theoretical prediction. For
each dictator, we construct three distinct consistency measures capturing whether choices for that

“Transfer” is defined as the amount by which the recipient’s payoff exceeds her minimum expectations payoff. In
a Give treatment, the transfer is the amount the dictator gives to the recipient. In a Take treatment, the transfer is the
amount the dictator does not taken from the recipient.
20
Dictator’s final payoff was strictly larger than the recipient’s payoff in 80% (489 out of 612) of choices.
19

18
subject were consistent with the predictions under (i) MMA, (ii) Property  , and (iii) convex
preference theory.
To test whether choices in our data are better explained by MMA than either of our
alternative models, we conduct a sign test using our indicator variable Consistency. Specifically,
for each agent i we construct a new variable zi that is the difference in the Consistency indicator
under the assumption that choice reflects MMA and the indicator for each of the alternative
models.

We then drop individuals whose choices are consistent with both MMA and the

alternative model and assign a value of -1 to dictators whose choices are inconsistent with both
models. Under the null hypothesis that MMA is no more likely to organize choice in our
experiment than either of the alternative models, this new variable should follow a binomial
distribution and the likelihood that zi  1 should be one-half. The alternative hypothesis is a onesided test that the likelihood zi  1 is greater than one-half.
Table 2 reports the fraction of dictators whose choices are consistent with a given model –
convex preference theory, MMA, or Property  . The first three rows of the table correspond to
the choices for dictators who were assigned to a given environment (i) Inequality, (ii) Equal, or
(iii) Envy whereas the final row reports data for all dictators in our experiment. The first two
columns of the table compare whether observed choices are better organized by MMA or convex
preference theory whereas the final two columns compare whether choices are better organized by
MMA or standard rational choice theory.
Property  vs. MMA. We test for data consistency with Property  (the Contraction Axiom) by
excluding 37 (out of 306) dictators whose choices in a Symmetric action set were from [Ai,Bi)
because Property  makes no prediction for their choices when the budget set is [Bi,Ci]. The last
two columns of Table 2 show the fraction of choices for the remaining 269 dictators that were
consistent with Property α (column 3) and MMA (column 4). As noted in the final row of Table
2, about half of the remaining dictators (135 out of 269) made choices that are consistent with
Property  and 78% (210 out of 269) made choices that are consistent with MMA. The Sign test
weakly rejects Property  in favor of MMA using data from all three environments. The observed
pattern, whereby the fraction of dictators whose choices are consistent with MMA is greater than
the fraction whose choices are consistent with standard rational choice theory, is robust across the
three (Envy, Inequality and Equal) environments. However, only data from the Equal environment
reject Property  in favor of MMA at conventional levels.
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Convex Preferences vs. MMA. Convexity requires invariance to action sets for all choices from
(Bi, Ci] but it makes no predictions on [Ak,Bk) when Bk is chosen from [Bk,Ck]. Eighteen dictators
in our experiment chose Bk in the Give or Take scenario and an allocation in [Ak,Bk) in the
Symmetric action set. Since these choice pairs are uninformative for testing convexity they are
excluded in the analysis below, leaving us with 288 dictators. 21 Convexity predicts the dictators’
two payoffs in their two choices will be the same whereas MMA predicts a larger payoff in the
scenario with the larger dictator moral reference point dimension r1 . The first two columns of
Table 2 show the fraction of choices for the 288 dictators whose choices are consistent with convex
preference theory (column 1) and MMA (column 4). As noted in the final row of the table, less
than half (47% or 135 out of 288) of dictators make choices that are consistent with convex
preferences; 80% (229 out of 288) are consistent with MMA whereas 20% violate MMA. The first
two columns of Table 2 show consistency figures for Convexity and MMA for each pair of games
as well as pooled data (last row). Convexity is rejected in favor of MMA by the Sign test at
conventional levels of significance for the pooled data and for dictators assigned to either the
Inequality or Equal environments.
TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE. CONSISTENCY WITH CONVEXITY, PROPERTY 

AND MMA

Size Effects and MMA. Recall that the recipient moral reference point dimension r2 is fixed for
any given (Inequality, Equal or Envy) environment (see Table 1) so variation in choices that violate
Property  or convex preferences reveal an r1 effect. To further investigate this effect, a new
variable

P was constructed by subtracting a dictator’s observed payoff in the treatment with

smaller MMA-predicted payoff from the dictator’s payoff in the treatment with (strictly or weakly)
larger MMA-predicted payoff. Figure 4 shows histograms of

P across the three treatments as

well as pooled data. The null hypothesis, P  0 is implied by Property  or convex preferences.
The alternative hypothesis, P  0 is consistent with MMA.
Figure 4 About Here. Histograms of ΔP (within subjects)

21

An alternative way is to replace all choices from [Ak,Bk) with Bk before analyzing data. Findings from this
alternative procedure are similar (though more in favor of MMA) to excluding data from these (18) dictators, which
is a more conservative approach.

20
The overall mean of

P (288 subjects) is 0.60 (95% C.I. is [0.260, 0.934]). Means of

P

across the three games are: 0.23 (Envy, one-sided p-value=0.138), 0.96 (Inequality, one-sided pvalue=0.005) and 0.63 (Equal, one-sided p-value=0.023). 22 The null hypothesis,

P  0 is

rejected in favor of the alternative hypothesis implied by MMA using the t-test (one-sided p-value
= 0.000).
To test for Property a we exclude choices of thirty-seven subjects for whom Property a
makes no predictions. The mean of

P (269 subjects) is 0.19 (95% C.I. is [-0.096, 0.475]). Means

of P across the three games are: 0.05 (Envy, one-sided p-value=0.379), 0.12 (Inequality, onesided p-value=0.343) and 0.40 (Equal, one-sided p-value=0.082). The null hypothesis, P  0 is
arguably rejected in favor of the alternative hypothesis implied by MMA using the t-test (onesided p-value = 0.096).
Together, results from the above tests using within-subjects data, can be summarized as
follows.
Result 1: Data support MMA when the moral reference point is more favorable to the dictator.
Specifically, our data suggest that final allocations depend upon the dictator’s moral reference
point and that payoffs for the dictator are increasing in this reference point. This finding is at odds
with convex preference theory and standard rational choice theory but consistent with the
predictions of MMA and our theory of moral costs.23

4.3 Test of MMA when the Recipient Moral Reference Dimension Changes
MMA says that the recipient’s payoff increases in r2 when r1 is fixed whereas convexity and
Property  predict no effect from changes in r2 . To test for r2 effects, we need to look across
environments.24 We have data for three levels of r1 that can be used to test responses to changing

22

For 18 subjects with choice B in a Give or Take action set and from [Ai, Bi) in the Symmetric design, a positive

P
could reflect the constraints of the experimental design rather than an r1 effect. To prevent this potential confound
from possibly biasing the test we are excluding P values for these 18 subjects.
23
Result 1 is consistent with findings from Cox et al. (2016) who use a similar experimental design to test the
importance of moral reference points on the choices of young children. As in our experiment, data from Cox et al.
(2016) show that final allocations depend on both initial endowments and feasible actions. As such, dictator choices
in their experiment violate the standard model of rational choice and any model that assumes convex preferences but
provide support for MMA.
24
There are five possible values of r1 in our experiment: 7, 11, 15, 19, 23. There is only one treatment (EnvySymmetric) with r1  7 and only one treatment (Inequality-Give) with r1  23 . As there is no variation of r2 with
these two

r1

values we can't use data from these two treatments to directly test MMA in terms of

r2 .
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values of r2 . We use Tobit models for our formal analysis throughout since the feasible choices
are bounded by the design of the experiment.
To evaluate whether the recipient’s minimal expectations point influences allocations as
predicted under MMA, we estimate two Tobit models – one that conditions choice solely upon r2
and a second that augments this model to include demographic controls for the dictator (gender,
race, GPA, religion, major, study year) – for each of the three levels of r1 in our experiment. Each
model controls for potential budget constraints (common support across games with a given r1 ) by
setting as a lower bound the lowest possible payoff a recipient could receive in the common support
and as an upper bound the highest possible payoff a recipient could receive in the common support.
Under standard models, the estimated coefficient on the minimal expectations point should be
equal to zero whereas MMA predicts that recipient payoffs are increasing in r2 and thus a positive
coefficient on this measure. Table 3 presents results for these models. The first two columns
restrict the analysis to the subset of choice where r1 = 15. The third and fourth columns restrict
the analysis to those choices where r1 = 19 and the final two columns to those choices where r1 =
11.
Data for r1 =15: There are three treatments with the same r1 =15 but three different r2
levels: Inequality-Symmetric ( r2 =3), Equal-Take ( r2 =7) and Envy-Give ( r2 =11). The recipient’s
average payoffs across the three treatments (see Table 1) increase as r2 increases: 9.12 (InequalitySymmetric), 10.17 (Equal-Take) and 13.43 (Envy-Give). The feasible payoffs for the recipient in
these three treatments are integers in the sets: [3, 19] in Inequality-Symmetric, [7,15] in EqualTake and [11,19] in Envy-Give. The budget sets for Envy-Give and Equal-Take are both
contractions of the Inequality-Symmetric budget set. Note that set [11,15] is included in all three
treatments. To control for constraints of budget sets on choices, we run Tobit regressions of
recipients’ final payoffs on data from the three treatments using 11 as the lower bound and 15 as
the upper bound. Table 3 reports Tobit estimates of r2 using models with and without demographic
control variables. Consistent with MMA, the estimates for r2 are positive (p<0.001), which rejects
the null hypothesis of conventional preferences (that the estimate is 0) in favor of the alternative
hypothesis from MMA.
Data for r1 =19: Treatments Inequality-Take and Equal-Give have both r1 =19 but r2
values are 3 and 7, respectively. The feasible payoffs for the recipient are from: [3,11] in
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Inequality-Take and [7,15] in Equal-Give. Set [7,11] is a subset of both sets, therefore we run Tobit
regressions of recipient’s final payoff with low bound 7 and upper bound 11. Tobit estimates for
effect of r2 on recipient’s payoff are positive (p<0.1) which weakly rejects the null hypothesis
from conventional preferences that the estimate is 0 in favor of the alternative hypothesis from
MMA.
Data for r1 =11: There are two treatments (Envy-Take, r2 =11 and Equal-Symmetric, r2 =7)
with r1 =11. The feasible set, [11, 19] in Envy-Take is a contraction of the feasible set, [7,23] in
Equal-Symmetric. So, we run Tobit regression with bounds 11 and 19. Tobit estimates for r2 are
positive (p<0.05), which rejects the null hypothesis from conventional preferences that the
estimate is 0 in favor of the alternative hypothesis from MMA.
Thus, using between-subjects data we conclude that:
Result 2: Data are consistent with MMA when the moral reference point is more favorable to the
recipient.
Across all models, the estimated coefficient on r2 (the recipient’s minimal expectations point) is
positive. Holding the dictator’s moral reference point constant, we find that a recipient’s payoff
is increasing in the minimal amount they could earn given the underlying budget set. This
dependence is at odds with standard models, but is consistent with the predictions of MMA and
provide additional evidence that moral reference points influence dictator behavior.
4.4 MMA and Transfers
The previous two sections provided direct tests of MMA with the focus on the payoff of the player
favored by the moral reference point. In this section, we turn our attention to indirect implications
of MMA and the effect of moral reference points on transfers, which is the dictator’s choice
defined in terms of “giving”. 25 Unless we look at budget sets with certain characteristics (as in
the previous sections on direct tests of MMA) differences in the support of feasible budget sets
across environments confounds our ability to use payoffs to test additional implications of MMA.26
To see the problem, note for example that the dictator’s payoff that corresponds to the most selfish

25

That is, in the Give action sets the transfer is the recorded subject’s choice. In the Take action set, taking x is by
design equivalent in terms of recipient’s payoff to “giving” 8-x, hence the transfer is 8 - x. Similarly, in the Symmetric
action set, the subject’s choice in terms of “giving” is 8- x if the subject takes x and 8+z if the subject gives z.
26
By design, feasible budget sets shift north-west to the advantage of the recipient as we move from Inequality to
Equal and then from Equal to Envy.
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feasible choice decreases from $27 (Inequality) to $23 (Equal) and down to $19 (Envy). By design,
payoffs to dictators in the Envy treatments will be lower than those in the Inequality treatments
independent of any choice they make. Looking at transfers (rather than payoffs) offers a way to
control for this confound as the set of feasible transfers is invariant across our three environments
(Inequality, Equality and Envy).
The feasible set of transfers is: [0,8] in both Give and Take action sets and [0,16] in the
Symmetric action set for all three environments. Appendix B provides detailed derivations of the
implications of MMA and conventional theory for the effects of changing r1 and r2 on transfers.
However, the basic intuition underlying these formal derivations is as follows. In terms of r2 and
dictator’s payoff m, any feasible transfer, t satisfies the equation (*) t  30  r2  m . 27
Conventional theory (Property  or convex preferences) requires that the dictator’s most





preferred allocation, m* , y * is preserved in all budget sets that contain it. Preservation of m

*

*

requires that optimal transfer, t decrease in r2 but be invariant with respect to r1 . In contrast, for
*

*

MMA we have: (1) larger r1 (ceteris paribus) implies larger m which comes with a smaller t ;
*

and (2) the direct effect (see (*)) of a larger r2 on t is negative whereas the indirect effect,

 m / r2  0 is positive because a larger r2 (ceteris paribus) increases y * . The effect of r2 on the
optimal transfer is negative as the direct effect is stronger (see Appendix B).
Thus, we have the following testable hypotheses that allow us to evaluate whether transfers
in our experiment are better organized by standard rational choice theory or our alternative model
and MMA:
Hr1 : Marginal effects of r1 : 0 (Property α) or negative (MMA)
Hr2 : Marginal effects of r2 : -1 (Property α) or between -1 and 0 (MMA)

The mean transfers are 4.99 (Inequality, r2 =3), 3.24 (Equal, r2 =7) and 2.37 (Envy, r2 =11).28 This
decreasing pattern is predicted by both MMA and conventional theory. However, the rate of
decrease seems to be half of the size predicted by conventional theory. Table 4 reports results of a

27

payoff is
28

y  r2  t
m  30  y  30  r2  t .

The recipient’s final payoff is

in every treatment and as our games are zero-sum games, the dictator’s

Kruskal-Wallis test: Chi-squared=30.25, p-value=0.001; for each subject, the data point is the mean of two observed
transfers.
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Tobit regression that allows us to estimate the effect of changing moral reference points on
observed transfers. The list of regressors includes dictator’s ( r1 ) and recipient’s ( r2 ) coordinates
of moral reference points of budget sets and, in model (2), demographic controls. As each dictator
made two choices, we cluster standard errors. As a robustness check, Table 4 also present results
from a Hurdle model (Cragg, 1971) which allows for the effects of moral reference points to differ
along the extensive (whether to make a positive transfer) and intensive (the amount of any positive
transfer) margins.
As noted in the first row of Table 4, the estimated coefficient on r1 is negative and
different from 0. The dependence of transfers on r1 rejects conventional preferences in favor of
MMA. The estimate of r2 , row two of Table 4, is negative which is consistent with the trend
observed in above reported means of transfers across games. The Wald test rejects the conventional
theory hypothesis that the estimate equals -1.29 The estimates are consistent with MMA and are
robust to both the inclusion of demographics in the regression and the use of a Hurdle model.
This provides our next result based on within-subjects and between-subjects data analysis.
TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE: TESTING r1 and r2 Effects on Transfers
Result 3: Convex preferences and Property  are rejected in favor of MMA.
In summary, our data provide empirical support for the predictions of changing moral reference
points on transfers under MMA. In contrast, the data call into question the standard model of
rational choice and models that assume convex preferences as organizing behavior in sharing
games.

Alternative Models. We now briefly look at implications of our data for alternative models of
behavior: random choices, selfish preferences, social preferences, reference dependence (Koszegi
and Rabin 2006), and sharing and sorting (Lazear, et al. 2012).
Random Choice: Our dictator games are simple and, in addition our subjects participated
in two practice rounds before making each of the two decisions. Nevertheless, if subjects are not
paying attention any feasible transfer, any t is equally likely to be chosen. The hypothesis of
random choice is rejected because parameter estimates for r1 and r2 are statistically significant.
29

F(1,610)=30.50, p-value=0.000.
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Selfish Preferences: Two-thirds of the transfers are positive and four out of five of our
dictators made at least one positive transfer. Any feasible non-zero transfer reduces a dictator’s
payoff; therefore, this model predicts that the transfer is always 0, and hence, neither changes in

r1 nor r2 will have an effect. Parameter estimates for both r1 and r2 are statistically significant;
hence our data reject selfish behavior.
Convex Social Preferences: All prominent models of social preferences, including
inequality aversion (Fehr and Schmidt 1999; Bolton and Ockenfels 2000), quasi-maximin
(Charness and Rabin 2002), and egocentric altruism (Cox and Sadiraj 2007) assume convex upper
contour sets. Because our data reject convex preference theory, these social preferences models
are also rejected.
Reference Dependent Model. Koszegi and Rabin (2006) develop a model of reference
dependence that has recently seen a surge in applied work. Predictions of this model for our games
are similar to standard rational choice theory because, in deterministic settings, optimal
“consumption” derived for the conventional preferences model is the “preferred personal
equilibrium” in the reference dependent model.30 Because our data reject conventional theory, the
reference dependent model is also rejected.
Sharing and Sorting. Lazear et al. (2012) offer a model of sharing that depends on the
environment, u( D, m, y) where D takes value 1 when the environment allows sorting and 0
otherwise. In all of our treatments sorting is not available (i.e., people cannot sort in or out of
participating in the games), hence implications of their model for play in our games are similar to
standard preference theory, which is rejected by our data.
To summarize, not only do our data provide evidence at odds with standard rational choice
theory, the data are also at odds with a suite of alternative behavioral models that have been used
to explain sharing. Viewed in its totality, we thus believe our data provides compelling evidence
that objectively defined moral reference points matter and influence choice in a manner consistent
with MMA.

5. IMPLICATIONS OF MMA FOR OTHER TYPES OF DICTATOR GAMES
To formalize the ways in which moral reference points may influence decision-making in dictator
games, we introduced the Moral Monotonicity Axiom (MMA) and applied it to analyze data from

30

See Proposition 3 in Koszegi and Rabin (2006, pg.1145).
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our experiment. Yet, MMA has broader implications for choice in a range of related experiments
including standard (give-only) dictator games (Andreoni and Miller 2002), other dictator games
that compare the effect of give versus take actions on choices (Korenok et al. 2014), the “bully”
dictator game (Krupka and Weber 2013), and dictator games with outside options (Lazear,
Malmendier, and Weber 2012).

5.1 MMA and WARP
As previously mentioned, Andreoni and Miller (2002) conducted dictator game experiments that
varied underlying budget sets and applied the generalized axiom of revealed preference (GARP)
to analyze the consistency of choices in their setting. Figure 5 illustrates two budget sets like those
that the dictator can face in the Andreoni and Miller design. Let point a denote the endowment on
the steeper line and point b denote the endowment on the flatter line. Further, consider the shaded
quadrilateral that is the intersection of sets bounded by the steeper and flatter budget lines. Viewed
through the lens of MMA, the shaded quadrilateral set can be considered a feasible set with
endowment at point a. The minimal expectations point is the origin (0,0) for all three feasible sets.
Therefore, the moral reference points for the three feasible sets are on the horizontal axis, halfway
between 0 and the respective endowment points. The moral reference point r b for the budget set
represented by the flatter budget line is more favorable to the dictator than the moral reference
point r a for the set represented by the steeper budget line.
FIGURE 5 ABOUT HERE: MMA AND WARP
Now consider two choices A and B from the original sets that violate the weak axiom of
revealed preference (WARP). Suppose that the dictator chooses A on the steeper budget line. Then
MMA (see Proposition 1) requires that A also be chosen from the quadrilateral set because it is a
contraction of the feasible set represented by the steeper line that preserves the moral reference
point. Suppose that B is chosen from the lower flat triangle. MMA requires that the choice in the
quadrilateral (which is also a contraction of the lower flat triangle) allocates to the dictator less
than B does, because r a is to the left of r b . But this contradicts the choice of A from the
quadrilateral set. Thus, any pair of choices of type A and B that violate WARP also violate MMA.
In fact, MMA places tighter restrictions on data than does WARP (e.g., in Figure 5 WARP implies
point A must be northwest of the intersection whereas MMA implies it must be west of point B).
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5.2 Give and Take: MMA vs. Warm Glow
Korenok et al. (2014) report a dictator game experiment to test the theoretical model of warm glow
developed by Korenok et al. (2013). In particular, the authors explore the effects of changing
endowments and framing actions as giving to or taking from the recipient. Korenok et al. (2014)
explain that data from their experiment is inconsistent with the predictions of their theory which,
in this instance, are the same as the predictions of the conventional rational choice model.
Yet, the exhibited data patterns are consonant with our theory of moral costs.31 Figure 6
illustrates five different scenarios in the Korenok et al. (2014) experiment. In all five scenarios,
the feasible set is the same set of discrete points on the budget line shown in Figure 6. What varies
across scenarios is the initial (endowed) allocation of $20 between the dictator and the recipient.
We represent these scenarios using the numbered points on the budget line in Figure 6. For
example, in scenario 1, the dictator is endowed with $20 and the recipient with $0. In scenario 9,
the recipient is endowed with $20 and the dictator with $0. Other endowments used in the
experiment are shown at points 3, 6, and 8 on the budget line in 6.

FIGURE 6 ABOUT HERE: ENDOWMENTS & MORAL REFERENCE POINTS
The Korenok et al. (2013) theory and conventional rational choice theory both imply that
choices will be invariant to changes in the endowments in the experiment. In contrast, our theory
implies that choices will monotonically track changes in the underlying endowment points. To see
this, note that the minimal expectations point is the origin (0,0) in all scenarios. Hence, the
corresponding moral reference points for all scenarios are on the horizontal axis, halfway between
0 and the dictator’s endowments for each of the respective scenarios. We have illustrated the
various moral reference points in Figure 6 as rj , for scenarios j = 1, 3, 6, 8, 9. MMA implies that
choices monotonically move northwest as the endowment moves northwest along the budget line.
Let S1 ($4.05) denote the average payoff of $4.05 to the recipient in scenario 1. Using this
same convention to reflect payoffs in the remaining scenarios, we have that the average recipient
payoffs for the five scenarios are: S1 ($4.05), S3 ($5.01), S6 ($5.61), S8 ($6.59), and S9 ($6.31).
31

Although we use the Korenok et al. (2014) data to explore implications of alternative theories, caution is called for
in basing conclusions on those data because the payoff protocol used in the experiment is not incentive compatible.
Their experiment involves role reversal in which each subject plays both dictator and recipient and is paid for both
decisions. This payoff protocol might create an incentive for strategic behavior, not an incentive for truthful
reporting of distributional preferences. Korenok et al. (2013), aware of this issue, report that this payoff protocol did
not introduce significant bias in their experiment. Incentive compatibility of alternative payoff protocols is examined
at length in Cox, Sadiraj, and Schmidt (2015).
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The fact that average payoffs differ across endowments is inconsistent with predictions from the
Korenok et al. (2013) theory and conventional rational choice theory. Importantly, however, the
observed changes are as predicted by our theory except for the decrease from $6.59 to $6.31
between scenario 8 and scenario 9 – a difference that Korenok et al. report to be statistically
insignificant at conventional levels.
5.3 MMA and Bully Games
MMA predicts both dictator game choices and social norms elicited by Krupka and Weber (2013).
In their experiment, the moral reference point is (5, 0) in the standard dictator game and (2.5, 0) in
the bully dictator game. Hence, MMA requires choices in the bully treatment to be drawn from a
distribution that is less favorable to the dictator than the distribution of choices in the standard
game. Therefore, we expect a higher amount allocated to the recipient and a positive estimate of
the bully treatment in an ordered logistic regression. The reported mean amounts allocated to the
recipients are $2.46 (standard) and $3.11 (bully) and the coefficient estimate for the bully treatment
is significantly positive (see their Table 2).
Moreover, the distribution of elicited norms reported in Krupka and Weber’s Table 1 are
also consistent with MMA. A paired t-test of the two distributions rejects the null hypothesis of no
effect (implied by Property  ) in favor of the MMA-consistent alternative (approval of higher
allocations to recipients). Hence, both actual choices and elicited beliefs in Krupka and Weber
(2013) are consistent with MMA and highlight the importance of objectively defined moral
reference points.
5.4 MMA and Outside Options
Lazear, et al. (2012) report an extended experimental design for dictator games that includes an
outside option that allows subjects to opt out of the dictator game. Their Experiment 1 is a betweensubjects design in which one group of subjects plays a “distribute $10” dictator game and another
group of subjects can choose an outside option, that pays the dictator $10 and the other subject $0,
or choose to play the distribute $10 dictator game.32 The Lazear, et al. Experiment 2 is a withinsubjects design including several decisions with one selected randomly for payoff. In Decision 1,
subjects play a distribute $10 dictator game. In Decision 2, subjects can sort out of the $10 dictator
game, and be paid $10 (with the other subject getting $0), or sort in and play the distribute $10
In sessions run in Barcelona the pie was €10 while sessions in Berkeley used a $10 pie. The text of the paper uses
the subject decision task description as an assignment to “divide $10 (€10)” while the subject instructions use the
wording “distribute $10 (€10)”.
32
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dictator game. In other decision tasks, subjects can sort out of a $S dictator game, and be paid $10
(with the other subject getting $0), or sort in and play the distribute $S dictator game. Values of S
varied from 10.50 to 20.33
Explaining behavior of subjects in Experiment 2 who sorted into a S > 10 dictator game
and kept more than 10 for themselves is straightforward. A more interesting behavior is that many
subjects sorted out, and were paid 10, when they could have sorted into a S > 10 dictator game and
retained more than 10 for themselves (and/or more than 0 for the other). For example, in the S =
11 game, the outside option pays (dictator, other) payoffs (10,0) whereas Pareto-dominating
payoffs such as (11,0), (10.50, 0.50) and (10,1) are available to a subject who sorts into the dictator
game. The reluctant/willing sharers model developed by Lazear et al. (2012) is consistent with
behavior patterns in the experiment. That model is a utility function with three arguments: own
payoff, other’s payoff, and a binary indicator variable with value 1 for the sharing (dictator game)
environment and value 0 for the non-sharing (outside option) environment. This type of behavior
is also consistent with our moral cost model in which choosing the outside option allows the
decision maker to avoid moral costs from making the sharing decision whereas choosing to play
the game involves this cost, as we now explain.
A subject has the right to choose the ordered pair of payoffs (10,0) by sorting out. This
provides a clear endowment for the two-step game that includes the option of sorting in and paying
the moral cost of making a sharing decision. Let S j denote that amount of money that can be
distributed in treatment j . Since the dictator’s sharing options include 0 and S j , the minimal
expectations point for the two-stage game is the natural origin. Hence the moral reference point if
the player sorts in is (r1 , r2 ) = ( 12  10,0) . Let preferences consistent with MMA be represented by
a utility function u(m  r1 , y  r2 ) . Substituting the budget constraint m  S j  y and the moral
reference point (5,0) the decision problem for our agent becomes max y u(S j  y  5, y) . The MMA
model is consistent with behavior by an agent who chooses the (10,0) outside option rather than
sorting in to play a distribute S > 10 dictator game with feasible payoffs that Pareto-dominate
(10,0) contained in its budget set.
Here we provide an example using a simple utility function, u(m, y)  m   y . By sorting
out, a subject can avoid the moral cost of making the sharing decision, obtain payoff allocation
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The experiment included anonymity and no-anonymity treatments.
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(10,0), and utility V (out) = 10 + q ´ 0. If the player sorts in then she incurs moral cost of making
the sharing decision, instantiated in the model by the moral reference point (r1 , r2 )  (5,0) and
MMA. The decision-maker’s optimization problem for the dictator game is
max y[0,S ] u(m  r1 , y  r2 )  max y[0, S ] ( S  y  5   y ) .

The optimal choice is y o   2 / 4 and the value of sorting in is V (in) = S - 5+ q 2 / 4 . Comparing
it to the value of sorting out, V (out )  10 , one has:
1. Any agent with (*)  2  4(15  S ) prefers sorting out and realizing payoff (10,0) to sorting
in and being able to choose Pareto-dominating payoffs.
2. As S increases, inequality S  5   / 4  10 becomes more likely to be satisfied and
2

therefore the fraction of subjects sorting in increases, as observed in Experiment 2.
Experiment 1 in Lazear et al. (2012) is a between-subjects design in which one group of
subjects play a distribute $10 dictator game and another group of subjects can sort out of the $10
dictator game, and be paid $10, or sort in and play the distribute $10 dictator game. The extended
game with the outside option is modeled as above with the MMA model using the unambiguous
(10,0) endowment provided by the outside option. The distribute $10 dictator game without outside
options is a commonly used protocol for dictator games in which neither the dictator nor the
recipient has a clearly assigned property right. This form of dictator game protocol is widely
viewed as appropriate for research on sharing behavior but it does have an ambiguous endowment,
as explained by Hoffman et al. (1994) and Hoffman, McCabe, and Smith (1996).34 Experiment 1
data are consistent with predictions from the MMA model which follow from interpreting the 10
available for distribution as endowments to the dictator and recipient of (10  z, z ) , with z  0 .

6. IMPLICATIONS OF MMA FOR PLAY IN STRATEGIC GAMES WITH
CONTRACTIONS
We next extend our discussion to illustrate the implications of MMA for play of strategic games
involving contractions. Games that have been studied in previous literature include: (1) the
moonlighting game and its contraction, the investment game, (2) carrot and stick games and a
contraction in the positive domain (carrot game) as well as a contraction in the negative domain,
The exact wording in the Hoffmann et al. subject instructions is “divide $10”. The exact wording in the Lazear,
et al. subject instructions is “distribute the $10 (€10)” although the text uses the wording “divide $10 (€10)”.
34
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(stick game). Together with dictator games, these games have been widely used in the literature to
measure different aspects of social behaviors, including trust and cooperation. MMA has different
implications for play of these games than does Property  or a stronger traditional assumption
such as convex preferences.

6.1 Investment and Moonlighting Games
The investment game (Berg, et al. 1995, and hundreds of other papers) can be constructed from
the moonlighting game (Abbink, et al. 2000, and scores of other papers) by contracting the feasible
choice sets of the first and second movers.35 Property  and MMA have different implications
regarding the effects of such contractions and allow a way to distinguish between the two models
using observed choice.
First, we argue that, for any given positive amount received, the second mover’s (SM’s)
choice is the same in the Moonlighting and Investment Games (with the same initial endowments).
This is the prediction of Property α as well as MMA because the reference point for the SM
opportunity sets is the same in the two games.
Next, we argue that for any first mover (FM) who sends a non-negative amount in the
moonlighting game, Property α requires that he choose the same amount to send in the Investment
Game. MMA, in contrast, requires him to choose a larger amount to send in the Investment Game.
The reason for this difference is that the moral reference point for the FM opportunity set is more
favorable to the FM in the moonlighting game than in the investment game.
An implication of the two statements is that MMA predicts more money being sent by all
FMs in the investment game than in the moonlighting game whereas Property α makes this
prediction only for FMs who take in the moonlighting game. Yet it is important to note that this
latter “prediction” results solely from the constraint that prevents taking in the investment game,
not from agent preferences in and of themselves.
Let e denote the endowment of each FM and each SM. The amount sent by the FM is
denoted by s. If s is positive it is multiplied by k >1 to obtain the amount received by the SM.
Taking is not feasible in the investment game. In the moonlighting game, if s is negative then the

35

In the standard moonlighting game, the first and second mover are each endowed with equal amounts of money.
The first mover can either give money or take money from the second mover, where the maximum amount that can
be given is the full endowment but the maximum amount that can be taken is part of the endowment. Money given is
transformed by a multiplier greater than 1 but money taken is not transformed. After the second mover learns about
the outcome, he/she can also give or take money from the first mover at some cost. The investment game differs
primarily in that the first mover can only give and not take.
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multiplier is 1 to obtain the amount taken from the SM. The amount returned by the SM is denoted
by r. Returning a negative amount is not feasible in the investment game. In the moonlighting
game, when r is negative it costs the SM r/k to take r from the FM.
SM opportunity sets across the two games: Let the SM be in information set M s for some
non-negative amount s sent by the FM in the moonlighting game. The M s set consists of options
that are costly for the SM but can increase/decrease FM’s monetary payoff: M s = M s+ È M swhere

M s+ = {(e - s + r,e + ks - r) : r Î[0,ks]}

M s- = {(e - s + r,e + ks + r / k) : r Î[-(e - s) / k,0)}
Consider the SM’s choice in M s in the Moonlighting Game when the FM sends a non-negative
amount. Consistent with observed behavior36 (as well as Pareto efficiency), the amount returned
will be from M s .
What are Property α and MMA predictions for SM’s choice in the investment game, at
information set I s given the same nonnegative s? In the investment game the SM’s choices can
only increase the FM’s monetary payoff by decreasing own monetary payoff,

I s = {(e - s + r,e + ks - r) : r Î[0,ks]}
Thus I s = M s+ Ì M s . Property α requires the same rs Î M s+ to be the SM’s choice in the
investment game. This is also the MMA prediction because sets M s and I s have the same moral
reference point, with coordinate e  s for the FM and e  ks / 2 for the SM.
FM choices across the two games: In the moonlighting game, the FM can send money to
the SM or take up to one-half of the SM’s initial endowment. Any positive amount sent (s > 0) is
multiplied by k > 1. Any amount taken (s < 0) is not transformed (it is one for one). The FM
choice set is M = M + È M - where

M + = {(e - s,e + ks) : s Î[0,e]}
M - = {(e - s,e + s) : s Î[-e / 2,0)}
Suppose that the FM’s choice in the moonlighting game is some non-negative s M . In the
investment game, the FM can only send money to the SM. The FM choice set is
36



Only 2 (out of 46) second movers who did not have money taken from them by first movers choose rs  M s .
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I = {(e - s,e + ks) : s Î[0,e]}
Thus, I = M + Ì M.
Property α requires the non-negative amount s M to be the FM’s choice in the investment
game when it is the choice in the moonlighting game because the feasible set in the investment
game is a contraction of the feasible set in the moonlighting game. In contrast, MMA implies that
the FM will send more in the investment game because the moral reference point, (FM coordinate,
SM coordinate) = (e / 2, e) in set I is more favorable to the SM than is the moral reference point

(e / 2, e / 2) in set M.
Implications for game play: Both Property  and MMA imply that for any positive amount
received the SM’s choices in the moonlighting and investment games are identical. We distinguish
between two types of FMs: the ones who send in the moonlighting game and the ones who take.
For a FM who takes in the moonlighting game, by design of the two games the FM must send
more in the investment game. For a FM who does not take in the moonlighting game, we have
shown above that Property α predicts the same amount being sent in the two games whereas MMA
predicts a larger amount being sent in the investment game.
Existing data that provide empirical support for MMA: We have analyzed data from an
investment game experiment reported in Cox (2004) and a moonlighting game experiment
reported in Cox, Sadiraj, and Sadiraj (2008). These two experiments used the same initial
endowments e  (10,10), the same multiplier k (=3) and were run by the same experimenter. Data
from these experiments are consistent with the implications of MMA and inconsistent with the
implications of Property  , as follows.
We have data from 64 subjects who participated in the investment game and 130
subjects (66 within-subjects design and 64 between-subjects design) who participated in the
moonlighting game.
FM choices: Using only FM data with non-negative sent, we find that the means of the
amounts sent are 5.97 (IG) and 4 (MG) and significantly different (t-test: one-sided p-value=
0.013. 37 Therefore the FM data are consistent with the above implications of MMA but
inconsistent with implications of Property  .

37

If we look only at Send > 0, the mean figures are 7.35 (IG) and 4.84 (MG) and significantly different (t-test: onesided p-value=0.002).
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SM choices: Estimates (standard errors in parentheses) of censored regressions for SM
choices at information sets with “FM not taking” (send  0 , N=78 ) are38

E(r s )  0.67*** (0.15)  s  0.41(0.29)  s  DM  0.23(1.30)  DM
Insignificance of the coefficients, DM and s  DM for “Moon” and “Send*Moon” are consistent
with the (same) implication of MMA and Property  , as discussed above.
Taken jointly, we conclude that differences in play across the moonlighting and investment
games are inconsistent with standard rational choice theory. Changes in the first mover’s moral
reference points across games leads to greater amounts shared in the investment game; a finding
that is consistent with the predictions of MMA.
6.2 Carrot, Stick, and Carrot/Stick Games
Andreoni, Harbaugh and Vesterlund (2003) look at effects of rewards and punishments on
cooperation by studying behavior in three games: the carrot game that offers incentives only in
terms of rewards, the Stick game that allows only for negative incentives (punishment) and the
carrot and stick game (CS) that offers players both types of incentives. The two single incentive
games are natural contractions of the CS game. We argue that for any given positive amount
received the SM’s predicted choice is the same in the CS and carrot game. This is the prediction
of Property α as well as MMA and arises as the moral reference point of the SM’s opportunity set
is the same in the two games. Next, we argue that for any positive amount received the SM’s
predicted choice is less malicious in the stick game than in the CS game according to MMA
because the moral reference point in the stick game favors the SM.
Let e = (240,0) in cents denote the endowments of the FM and the SM. The amount sent, s
by the FM is the amount received by the SM and can take values from [40, 240] in all three games.
The amount returned, rs by the SM can be positive (carrot), negative (stick) or either (CS game)
as returning a negative amount is not feasible in the carrot game whereas returning a positive
amount is not feasible in the stick game. Regardless of the sign of the amount returned, the FM
receives 5rs .
SM choices across the three games: For the amount s sent by the FM let the SM feasible sets be
denoted by M css in the CS game, M cs in the carrot game and M ss in the stick game such that
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Send > 0 (N=64): E(r s )  0.65*** (0.17)  s  0.42(0.36)  s  DM  0.14(1.87)  DM
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M css  M cs

M ss . The M css set consists of options that are all costly for the SM but can increase

or decrease FM’s monetary payoff. The sets are:

M cs  (240  s  5r, s  r ) : r  [0, s]
M ss  (240  s  5r, s  r ) : r  [max{(240  s) / 5,  s},0]
Let rcs be the SM’s choice in the CS game when the FM sends amount s. Property α and MMA
predictions for SM’s choice when the FM sends amount s are as follows:
a. Carrot game: In this game the SM’s choices can only increase the FM’s monetary payoff by
decreasing own monetary payoff. Property α requires that if the SM choice in the CS game is
positive, i.e. rcs  M cs then it remains a most preferred return in the carrot game. This is also
the MMA prediction because sets M css and M cs have the same moral reference point,

 240  s  as the FM coordinate and (s / 2) as the SM coordinate. Andreoni et al. (2003, Figure
6) find larger demand for rewards in the CS game than in the carrot game which is inconsistent
with both Property α and MMA.
b. Stick game: In this game the SM’s choices can only decrease the FM’s monetary payoff by
decreasing own monetary payoff. Property α requires that if the SM’s most preferred choice
in the CS game is to reduce the FM’s monetary payoff, i.e., rcs  M ss then it remains a most
preferred return in the stick game. MMA, however, predicts in the stick game a smaller return
in absolute value because the moral reference point favors the SM as its coordinate is s (rather
than s / 2 ) whereas the FM’s coordinate remains the same,  240  s  . Andreoni et al. (2003,
Figure 5) report a result they characterize as “surprising” (pg. 898) that demand for
punishment is larger in the CS game than in the stick game. This result is predicted by MMA
but is inconsistent with Property α.

Taken in its totality, data from Andreoni et al. (2013) provides evidence inconsistent with
standard rational choice theory and mixed support for MMA. Importantly, however, MMA can
rationalize a data pattern that Andreoni et al. (2013) label as surprising; that the demand for
punishment is greater in the CS game than in the stick game. As the moral reference point for the
SM in the stick game is more favorable than in the CS game, this is precisely what one would
expect under MMA.
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7. CONCLUDING REMARKS
When faced with the opportunity to share resources with a stranger, when and why do we give?
The dictator game has emerged as a key data generator to provide researchers with a simple
approach for eliciting other-regarding preferences in a controlled setting. The game has worked
well in the sense that we now understand giving behaviors at a much deeper level. What has been
less well explored is whether received results violate the basic foundations of economic theory.
Recent dictator game experiments reveal that choices of subjects in specific pairs of
dictator games are inconsistent with convex preference theory (List, 2007; Bardsley, 2008;
Cappelen et al., 2013). But the designs of these experiments do not provide an empirical challenge
to rational choice theory. We take this next step by designing an experiment that generates data to
test the empirical implications of Property  that is central to the theory. We find data that are
inconsistent with extant rational choice theory. Our experimental design and data suggest why,
and how, rational choice theory needs to be extended to maintain consistency with our data
patterns.
In this spirit, we propose moral reference points as features of feasible sets and a moral
monotonicity axiom (MMA). An implication of MMA is preservation of the contraction property
of rational choice theory for feasible sets and subsets that have the same moral reference point.
The moral reference points we propose are observable features of feasible sets, not subjective
reference points that can be adjusted ex post to fit new data.
Development of the MMA model was motivated by an initial objective of rationalizing
otherwise-anomalous data from dictator games with giving and taking opportunities. The model,
however, has more general applicability. We explain how it can rationalize data from other types
of dictator games in the literature. More importantly, we explain how the model has implications
for play of strategic games involving contractions of feasible sets that differ from implications of
extant theory.
The model and experimental data lead us to conclude that moral reference points play a
major role in the decision to act generously. As a whole, these findings highlight the importance
of revisiting standard models to explore the role of moral reference points in a broader array of
choice settings. In the paper, we have briefly provided an explanation of how the theory our morel
reference points is predictive of received findings in a range of economic games designed to elicit
social and cooperation behaviors. In this manner, we view our results as having both positive and
normative import. For empiricists and practitioners, the results herein provide an indication that
moral costs can play an important role in welfare calculations and program evaluation.
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TABLES

Table 1. Summary Statistics

Inequality

Equal

Envy

Give
Take
Symmetric
Give
Take
Symmetric
Give
Take
Symmetric

Moral Reference
Point

Ave. Transfera
(st. dev.)

Ave. Final
Payoffsb

Nobs

(23,3)
(19,3)
(15,3)
(19,7)
(15,7)
(11,7)
(15,11)
(11,11)
(7,11)

4.54 (2.96)
4.19 (3.34)
6.12 (4.95)
2.65 (2.24)
3.17 (2.88)
3.94 (3.52)
2.43 (1.65)
2.06 (1.85)
2.64 (2.55)

(22.46, 7.54)
(22.81, 7.19)
(20.88, 9.12)
(20.35, 9.65)
(19.83, 10.17)
(19.06, 10.94)
(16.57, 13.43)
(16.94, 13.06)
(16.36, 13.64)

61
81
82
66
58
62
67
69
66

a. “Ave. Transfer” is the amount by which the average recipient’s payoff chosen by dictators
exceeds the recipient’s minimum expectations payoff (standard deviations in parentheses).
b. Final payoffs, with dictator payoff first followed by recipient payoff.

Table 2. Consistency with Convexity, Property  and MMA

Environments

Inequality
Equal
Envy
All

Data with Convex Preferences
Predictions
Convexity
MMA
39.36 (94)

Data with Property 
Predictions
MMA
Property 

78.72.017 (94)

45.68 (81)

75.31 (81)

.016

46.24 (93)

81.72

(93)

48.31 (89)

80.90.052 (89)

54.46 (101)

78.22 (101)

55.56 (99)

77.78 (99)

46.88 (288)

.003

50.19 (269)

78.07.097 (269)

79.51

(288)

Note: Entries are percentages of choices consistent with predictions by the model in a column. Number
of subjects in brackets. Entries as superscripts are one-sided p-values (when <.1) for the Sign Test. To
conduct the Sign Test, observations that are consistent with Property  are coded as 0, the ones that
are consistent with MMA (but violate Property  ) are coded as 1, whereas observations that violate
both (MMA and Property  ) are coded as -1.
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Table 3. Tests for Effects of Recipient Moral Reference Dimension

Recipient’s
Final Payoff

r2 [+]

r1 =15

r1 =19

r1 =11

0.674***
(0.187)

0.668***
(0.186)

0.415*
(0.215)

0.391*
(0.221)

0.330**
(0.155)

0.328**
(0.151)

Constant

6.145***
(1.548)

6.955***
(2.417)

6.435***
(1.143)

5.616***
(1.895)

8.620***
(1.480)

9.341***
(1.797)

Demographics
Observations
Log-likelihood

no
207
-261.3

yes
207
-258.3

no
147
-224.8

yes
147
-221.4

no
131
-225.9

yes
131
-219.4

Notes: Entries are Tobit estimated coefficients. MMA predicted sign in square brackets. Demographics include
gender, race, GPA, religion, major and study year. Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.001, **p<0.05, p*<0.1

Table 4. Moral Reference Points and Transfers
Dep. Variable
Transfer
r1 [-]

r2 [-]
Demographics
Observations

Hurdle

Model

Tobit

Model

(1)

(2)

(1)

(2)

-0.058**
(0.027)

-0.055**
(0.027)

-0.098**
(0.047)

-0.104**
(0.047)

-0.319***
(0.047)
no
612

-0.314***
(0.047)
yes
612

-0.497***
(0.091)
no
612

-0.487***
(0.090)
yes
612

Notes: MMA predicted sign in square brackets. Entries are average marginal effects (Hurdle Model) and coefficients
(Tobit model). Standard errors (clustered at subject ID level) in parentheses. Demographics include gender, race, GPA,
religion, major and study year. Low and upper bounds in regressions are 8 and 0. b *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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FIGURES
Figure 1. Feasible Sets: [B, C] for Give or Take, [A, C] for Symmetric
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Figure 2. Histograms using Data from List (2007) and Bardsley (2008)

List (2007)
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Bardsley (2008) - Experiment 2
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Notes: In the upper panel, Baseline refers to the standard dictator game in which dictators can choose to give $0 to $5
to the receivers. The Take $1 refers to the dictator game in which the feasible set is augmented to allow taking $1
from the recipient. In the lower panel, the Giving Game 2 refers to a standard dictator game in which dictators can
choose to give $0 to $7 to receivers. Taking Game 2 refers to a game that is augmented to allow taking $2 from the
recipient.
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Figure 3. Example of Choice with non-Convex Preferences
Recipient's
Payoff
A
y

B

x
C

Dictator's
Payoff

Figure 4. Histograms of ∆𝑷 (within subjects)

Notes: ∆P is constructed as follows. Each subject made two choices and for each choice the final own payoff was
calculated. If the subject made a choice in Take and one in Give action sets then ∆P is payoff in Give minus payoff
in Take. If the subject made one choice in Take and one choice in Symmetric actions sets then ∆P is payoff in Take
minus payoff in Symmetric. Finally if the subject made one choice in Give and one choice in Symmetric actions sets
then ∆P is payoff in Give minus payoff in Symmetric.
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Figure 5. MMA Implies WARP for the Andreoni and Miller Experiment

Figure 6. Endowments and Moral Reference Points for Korenok, et al. Treatments
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APPENDICES
Appendix A. Proof of Proposition 1
Let f belong to both F and G . Consider any g from G *. As G and F have the same moral
*

g
f
reference point, r  r , MMA requires that gi  fi and gi  fi , i . These inequalities can be

simultaneously satisfied if and only if g = f , i.e. f belongs to G * which concludes the proof
for Property  M . Note, though, that any choice g in G * must coincide with f , an implication
of which is G * must be a singleton. So, if the intersection of F * and G is not empty then choices
satisfy property  M .
Appendix B. Effect of Moral Reference Point on Transfers
“Transfer” is defined as the amount by which the recipient’s payoff exceeds her minimum
expectations payoff. In a Give treatment, the transfer is the amount the dictator gives to the
recipient. In a Take treatment, the transfer is the amount the dictator does not taken from the
recipient. In all treatments, the dictator makes a choice of an amount to give or take that we here
represent by a transfer, t  T , where T=[0,16] in the Symmetric version (Envy, Equal and
Inequality) and T=[0,8] in the Give/Take scenarios (Envy, Equal and Inequality). The feasible set
is
X   m, y  |m  y  30, y  y0  t, t  T 

where  m, y  are dictator’s and recipient’s final monetary payoffs. Let e and r be the initial
endowment and the moral reference point of set X, that is, r1 

1
 m  max T   e1  and r2  y0 . If
2

the dictator chooses t  T then the recipient’s and dictator’s final payoff are y  t  r2 and

m  30  y  30  (r1  r2 ) .
(Conventional) other-regarding preferences

39

Let P*   m* , y *  be the dictator’s most

preferred allocation of $30. Then when the dictator faces a set X that contains P* , by Property 
the dictator’s choice of transfer t o is such that t o  r2  y* . Thus, as r2 increases, the most
*
preferred transfer, t o decreases for as long as the set X contains P , and it is 0 after that. Using

utility representation terminology, let dictator’s preferences be represented by some concave, mincreasing C1 function u  m, y  . The dictator’s decision problem is

39

Such preferences include inequality aversion (Bolton and Ockenfels 2000, Fehr and Schmidt 1999), quasi-maxmin
(Charness and Rabin 2002) or ego-centric altruism preferences (Cox and Sadiraj 2012).

49

maxtT u(m, y )  u  30  r2  t, r2  t 
By concavity of u .  , the optimal t o if from the interior of T solves G  t, r   u   1,1  0.
 t o 





o
Apply the implicit theorem to get 40 sign 
  sign Gr  t , r   0 and as G .  does not

r
 2
2

t o
(directly) depend on r1 ,
 0 . Thus we have the following hypothesis:
r1

Hypothesis  : The optimal transfer, t o decreases in r2 but is not affected by r1
MMA type of preferences Let dictator’s choice satisfy MMA and suppose that dictator’s choices
can be recovered as a solution to the following maximization problem41
maxtT u(m  r1, y  r2 )  u  30   r1  r2   t, t 

where u () is a concave C1 function. Let t r be the optimal transfer.
By MMA, dictator’s optimal payoff, m*  30   r1  r2   t r increases in r1 , i.e.,
m*
t r
t r
 1 
 0 . It follows that, (*)
 0.
r1
r1
r1

Next, let F  t, r   u(m  r1, y  r2 )   1,1 . By concavity, the optimal t r (at the interior)
solves F  t r , r   0 . To show that
 t r
sign 
 r2

t r
 0 use (*) and the implicit function theorem:
r2


 F 
 F 
 t r

sign

sign

sign







 r2 
 r1 
 r1


.


Thus we have the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis MMA: The optimal transfer, t r decreases in r2 as well as in r1
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o
By concavity of u(  ), Gr2 t , r2  u11  2u12  u22  Q  1,1  0. .

41

One way to think about a dictator who is “socially” cautious is that he can claim social credits only for the transfer

part, t rather than all recipient’s payoff, r2

t

(as the recipient gets

r2 no matter what by the experimenter). If so then

rather than the distribution of 30, the dictator’s problem is the distribution of
the other person.

(30 - (r2 + r1 )) between oneself and

